Introduction
Inflation expectations play a crucial role in economic decision making and inflation dynamics, and survey measures of inflation expectations are strong predictors of future inflation (Friedman, 1968; Phelps, 1967; Ang et al., 2007; Faust and Wright, 2013; Binder, 2015) . Central bankers are tasked with controlling inflation, so they see it as essential that inflation expectations be anchored at the policy target (Bernanke, 2007; Yellen, 2015; Draghi, 2018) . Indeed, central bankers now commonly make statements like: "Well-anchored expectations are an indicator of the success and the credibility of a price stability-oriented monetary policy" (European Central Bank, 2012, p. 65) .
But what does "anchored" mean? Researchers and policymakers often compare (average or median) long-run inflation expectations to the inflation target (see of England (2010) ; European Central Bank (2012)), and the most common interpretation of anchored expectations is that average inflation forecasts across agents, especially at long horizons, remain stable and close to the inflation target (Ball and Mazumder (2018) ; Kumar et al. (2015) ). Most formal tests focus on the insensitivity of median or average expectations to "news" or incoming economic data (see e.g., Beechey et al. (2011 ), or Carvalho et al. (2017 for a theoretical treatment). We take a simpler and more direct tack. We focus on individual forecasters, because aggregate statistics can, for example, obscure divergent anchoring points or large swings in the expectations of an individual forecaster's panel. We argue that for an individual's expectations to be well-anchored, 1 they should remain near the central bank's target. In rational expectations models, if agents know the central bank's target and are certain of its commitment to that goal, their long-run expectations will be perfectly anchored to that target.
We use panel data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), a long-running quarterly survey of macroeconomic forecasts in the United States that is currently conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 2 SPF respondents provide forecasts for both PCE and CPI inflation at 5-year and 10-year horizons, from which we compute implied 5-year/5-year-forward forecasts, i.e., forecasts for average inflation over 6 to 10 years ahead, which we refer to as long-run forecasts. 3 A central bank will typically choose a single inflation measure to target. But if other inflation measures have a reasonably well-behaved relationship to this target measure, and if longer-run expectations of the other measures are not anchored, this would cast doubt on whether inflation expectations are truly anchored at all-even if expectations of the target measure appear anchored. Respondents whose forecasts support financial market interactions could well focus most of their attention on the consumer price index (CPI). CPI inflation is used as the reference rate for Treasury inflation protected securities (TIPS) and other financial assets, in addition to its widespread use in other contexts such as indexing Social Security payments (Haubrich and Millington, 2014) . In this paper, we consider a forecaster's expectations to be "anchored" if these long-run forecasts for both inflation rates remain within a "box" close to the target, as we will define below. As indicated in figure 1, median long-run inflation forecasts have been quite stable and near 2 percent since 2007. This suggests that inflation expectations are well anchored. But this stability of the median obscures significant individual heterogeneity, volatility, and persistent disagreement. 5 At the individual level, we find that when taking the post-2012 period as a whole, not a single SPF respondent is anchored.
Some forecasters have expectations that vary substantially over time. Others have consistent upward or downward biases with little variation-effectively, these respondents have expectations that are anchored, but at the wrong spot.
We take for granted that SPF respondents are fully aware of the January 2012 FOMC announcement, and its implications. Hence, persistent disagreement must therefore stem from different views about either the FOMC's commitment, or ability, to deliver on its promises. 6 As Binder (2017b) suggests, there appears to be a disconnect between FOMC communications and intent, and inflation expectations. However, in this regard, we find evidence of "delayed anchoring": Respondents have generally moved toward the box since 2012, particularly after the first federal funds rate hike in late 2015. By 2018, 64 percent of responses were in the box. 4 While both the CPI and PCE price indexes are based on the prices of a basket of consumer goods, they differ somewhat in scope (the goods and services in the basket), in weights on different items, and in the formula used in their computation. See Binder et al. (2019) for analysis and a brief synopsis, and Clark (1999) for a more thorough discussion.
5 Disagreement is not the same as uncertainty, see Rich and Tracy (2018) . Mailath and Samuelson (2019) argue that persistent disagreement likely derives from different prediction models, which accords with the conclusions of Patton and Timmermann (2010) . See also Branch (2004 ), Stark (2013 , and Döpke et al. (2017) for evidence. While the persistent forecast differences we identify could arise from dissimilar strongly held prior views, Mailath and Samuelson (2019) suggest that dissimilar priors "impose virtually no discipline on the relationship of the beliefs of different agents... In contrast, model-based reasoning insures that agents' beliefs about the events they deem relevant are firmly anchored to the data." In their stylized environment, they demonstrate that "the wisdom of crowds" can hold and information can aggregate when Bayesian agents use different prediction models. 6 A different approach might assume that agents must learn about the monetary policy rule actually being followed by the FOMC; see, e.g., Ball (1995), Bullard and Mitra (2002) , Branch and Evans (2006) or Nunes (2009) . This seems more relevant when a central bank has not revealed its inflation target, unless there is doubt about the truthfulness of the FOMC communication. To the extent that a forecaster relies upon a statistical prediction for her long-run PCE inflation forecasts, or thinks she must learn an actual inflation target that may differ from the stated target, we view this as a tacit vote of distrust that the FOMC will achieve its stated target. Among respondents who fully trust the FOMC's ability to achieve its stated target, long-run CPI inflation forecasts might differ, but only to a modest extent that is related to different views about the CPI-PCE differential. Figure 2 is a "box figure" that plots each long-run CPI and PCE inflation forecast from 2012 to 2018 for the 35 forecasters who provided at least 14 forecasts of both. The shaded box corresponds to expectations that are anchored close to the FOMC target; to be anchored, both long run PCE and CPI forecasts must remain in the box. What does "close" mean? Somewhat arbitrarily, we define "close" to mean that long-run PCE forecasts are within ± 0.2 ppt from the FOMC target, and that CPI forecasts that are within ± 0.5 ppt from the implied CPI target-where we apply a long-run CPI/PCE differential of 0.2 ppt, based upon Binder et al. (2019), with a wider CPI band to account for differences in opinion about the long-run CPI/PCE differential. 7 (As will be clear below, our results are insensitive to modest changes in these ranges.) When we pool forecasts across respondents and quarters, 47 percent of the forecasts are in the box. 7 The analysis of Binder et al. (2019) indicates that reasonable year-ahead forecasts of the CPI/PCE differential (in ppts) over the post-2012 period will lie within [0.1,0.4]. Among SPF respondents, CPI and PCE long-term forecasts have a correlation of 0.89, the median difference between CPI and PCE forecasts is 0.2 percentage points, and the difference is rarely below 0 or above 0.5. Furthermore, our CPI range also nests the "equivalent percentile" range: 48 percent of PCE responses lie between 1.8 and 2.2 percent, and 48 percent of long-run expected CPI inflation responses lie between 2.1 percent and 2.5 percent. However, our results are insensitive to the size of this differential. To provide some visual evidence about delayed anchoring for the respondents in aggregate, Figure 5 depicts our box figure for 2007, 2009, 2012, 2015, and 2018 . In 2009, the response spread was greatest. 10 In 2012, respondents still had a remarkable diversity of views, with only 31 percent of responses in the box. Figure 10 in the appendix, we 8 An exhaustive set of these individual forecaster plots can be found in the appendix 9 In the appendix, we explore various notions of "almost anchored," such as "who needs only a slightly bigger box?', and how this "requisite box size" distribution has changed over time. Also, since anchoring is often assessed by insensitivity to incoming data and low volatility, in the appendix we provide two multivariate measures that correspond to the notion of volatility, and display how these distributions have changed over time.
"In the Box" Expectations
10 Consistent with this, Chan and Song (2018) find, on the basis of high-frequency financial market data, that inflation expectations uncertainty spiked dramatically in 2009. 11 The determinant of the covariance matrix, |Σ|, is central to information theory and statistical inference. For kdimensional data, a normalization of the covariance determinant is often suggested: |Σ| 1/k (e.g., Tatsuoka and Tyler (2000) ). Assuming a uniform distribution of responses, our box has a scaled covariance determinant of 0.024. What might these changes over time be attributed to? One candidate explanation is variation in trust. Christelis et al. (2016) find that trust in the central bank is a key determinant of inflation expectations, independent of respondents' financial sophistication and knowledge of central bank functions. The years of the Great Recession provoked a large dispersion in forecasters' beliefs. As the crisis began to unfold in the fall of 2007, the Federal Reserve began aggressively cutting the federal funds rate, which subsequently dropped from 5.25 percent to its zero lower bound. The monetary base expanded dramatically. Inflation, meanwhile, fell below zero. Financial and macroeconomic uncertainty was high. The first of the large-scale asset purchasing programs generated concerns of high future inflation for some, while, for others, given the amount of slack in the economy, prolonged low inflation seemed likely. 12 12 In 2007:Q4, the SPF included a special question about inflation targeting. At that time, roughly half of the respondents believed that the Fed had an implicit (core PCE) inflation target; but comments reveal serious doubts In 2010, not only did the policy rate stay at zero, but unconventional monetary policy actions were undertaken; PCE inflation briefly rose above 2 percent, but then fell notably. There were sizable revisions to policymakers' forecasts and to data releases, revealing substantial uncertainty about the duration and depth of the recession (see, e.g., Alessi et al. (2014) ). The policy actions and forecast revisions may have led some forecasters to conclude that the FOMC would be unwilling or unable to rein in inflation going forward. In January 2012, the FOMC explicitly stated its policy target of 2 percent inflation in the PCE price index. However, Figure 5 , which plots responses after this announcement, suggests that it had only a modest effect on the number of forecasters in the box. Based on a special survey question in the SPF in mid-2012, respondents who were "above-the-box" reported concerns about the Fed's balance sheet, food and energy inflation, and fiscal imbalances. 13 Throughout 2015, numerous forecasters continued to expect quite high inflation over the next 10 years. But in December of that year, the first rate increase occurred. The actual tightening of monetary policy may have convinced some of the forecasters who were worried about high inflation that the FOMC would indeed act to rein in inflation, if that became necessary. 14 15
To investigate this hypothesis, we consider a regression specification that is motivated by related specifications in Rich and Tracy (2017) and Fuhrer (2018) . Rich and Tracy (2017) find that forecasters-especially forecasters with greater disagreement-tend to revise their forecasts toward the median forecast of the previous period. Fuhrer (2018) studies short-run inflation expectations and similarly finds forecast revisions toward the median. In an imperfect information context, where different forecasters might have different information, the median forecast might provide useful information about the current medium-frequency trend in a variable. 16 However, in this paper we study the long-run inflation expectations of well-informed forecasters, which are really about trust in the central bank's ability to achieve its (known) inflation target. We thus focus on that target per se, and whether expectations are approaching the target over time. We also ask whether this became more pronounced starting in 2016:Q1. We continue with our multivariate approach: "Moving toward target" means that both the CPI and the PCE inflation forecasts are moving toward target. Thus, defining f CPI i,t as the long-run inflation expectations of respondent i (and defining f PCE i,t similarly), our panel regression specification is: 17 about its commitment to attaining that target. 13 Nechio (2015) provides further context. We find that the accuracy of one-quarter-ahead and four-quarter-ahead PCE inflation forecasts relative to CPI inflation forecasts improved after 2012, consistent with a view that forecasters began to focus more attention on PCE inflation after the FOMC announcement.
14 The reduction in high inflation responses is not due to attrition, as is evident from the figures in the appendix. For a recent model featuring persistent disagreement via different levels of trust and different forecasting models, see Hachem and Wu (2017) . In this study, inflation expectations do not immediately converge to the central bank's target, because credibility must be earned, beliefs propagate via social dynamics, and agents care about forecast accuracy. The more stubborn are beliefs, the longer it will take for expectations to converge.
15 During 2015, financial markets began to anticipate a rate increase. Uncertainty, however, remained high until shortly before the December meeting. See Appendix A.2 16 Demertzis and Viegi (2009) model monetary policy as an information game played between individuals and the central bank featuring strategic complementarity. In that framework, optimal policy responds to average expected inflation, and optimal expected inflation can be a function of average expected inflation. 17 As discussed above, we take 2.2 percent to be the implied CPI target. See Binder et al. (2019) for more analysis.
(
There are mathematically equivalent ways to re-specify this regression, but (1) and (2) are particularly transparent. A "perfectly anchored" respondent would have "small" β and φ coefficient estimates, and all other coefficient estimates would be 0.
We find significant evidence that responses are moving into the box after 2016; by "a move into the box after 2016," we mean that after 2016, both responses are in the box in expectation. 18, 19 We can compute respondent i's expected response by generalizing the usual AR (1) Further motivated by studies such as Rich and Tracy (2017) and Christelis et al. (2016) , we also investigate whether movement toward anchoring differs, depending on the nature of disagreement prior to 2012.
In particular, we partition respondents into three groups: undershooters, near the target, and overshooters. 20 Undershooters have average responses below the box; overshooters have average responses above the box; and near the target had average responses in the box. 21 Both overshooters and those initially near the target display notably less persistence in responses after 2016. Note that Table 2 does not depict individual intercept terms δ i , λ i , γ i , and µ i . In unrestricted regressions these were generally statistically significant, and for many, λ i → −δ i and µ i → −γ i ; responses moved towards the target after 2016. 18 While we believe a break sometime in 2015:Q1 or 2016:Q1 is defensible on a priori grounds, we conducted a search to determine the most likely break-date between 2014 and 2017 (if any). Regression fit is maximized for a break occurring in 2016:Q1. As noted above, an F-test confirms the statistical significance of this break.
19 Nautz and Strohsal (2015) confirm previous studies that found de-anchoring of inflation expectations during the crisis, and ask whether inflation expectations had become re-anchored by the end of 2014. They conclude that they had not. Our results are consistent with this study, in that we find wide dispersion of expectations and relatively few responses in the box in 2009, and we find that a pronounced shift toward the box occurred after 2015.
20 Six of our respondents entered in 2012, and thus could not be assigned to a group using our methods. They remain in the full set analysis, however.
21 Group 1 was omitted from a regression as there were only three respondents. For more details on how the partitioning was conducted, see the appendix. Significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 is denoted as *, **, and ***. Except when explicitly mentioned in § , t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. † We report the average of δ i , λ i , γ i , and µ i as the average coefficient. There is considerable dispersion of these respondent-specific intercept terms. § In lieu of a t-statistic, the F-test statistic from the test for joint significance of the relevant respondent-specific terms is reported. ‡ In Group 3, we drop respondent 563, whose responses are sufficiently different that they influence parameters notably. Including 563 would lead to the conclusion that this respondent group did not move into the box after 2016. For this group, we omit the λ and µ terms from the regression specification, since these were not statistically significant.
Conclusion
Are long-run inflation expectations anchored? We provide an intuitive new metric to answer this question.
We find that there is not one SPF respondent whose long-run inflation expectations have been absolutely anchored since 2012, or even since 2015. However, we find evidence that respondents are steadily moving into our box, what might be termed "delayed anchoring." Thus our study makes two points. First, despite the steadiness of the median 10-year forecast, individual SPF respondents are not anchored to the Fed's target (a finding consistent with Binder (2017b) and Coibion et al. (2019) ). Second, notable progress has been made in expectations becoming anchored (in keeping with Doh and Oksol (2018) ).
What accounts for these findings? We offer only tentative conclusions. Anchoring is about knowledge of central bank objectives or trust. Either information from the FOMC is not being heard (or at least not understood clearly), or it has been met with skepticism. As this study focuses on professional forecasters, we are inclined to believe the latter. Based on our view that an anchored respondent must respond within the box, we conclude that over one-third of professional forecasters continue to doubt that the FOMC will attain its target at the 5-to-10 year horizon.
As noted above, we believe that persistent disagreement in SPF expectations stems from the use of different models. One interesting direction for future work would be to build on the recent work of Berge (2018) and attempt to categorize respondents in terms of similar models, perhaps exploiting information across several variables. We leave this, and the exploration of the relationship between long-run inflation forecasts and inflation forecast accuracy at shorter horizons, for future work. 
A Appendix

A.1 Robustness Checks for Significance
The overwhelming majority of individual's intercepts and 2016 onward variables are significant, but do we observe joint significance for these variables? We perform F-tests on both the ID-specific constants and the ID-specific post-2016 dummy terms and locate evidence for joint significance. In particular, the restricted equation in Test 1 (for CPI) is:
, The restricted equation in Test 2 is:
The unrestricted equation in both tests is
We also perform a test for poolability in panel data to see if the panel can be combined, i.e. "pooled," into one single constant-coefficient model. Using our 2016-onward dummy variable as the variable in question, we employed the Roy-Zellner test for poolability, as described in Vaona (2008) . At the α=0.05 level, we reject the null of poolability. This provides further evidence that there is a break in the data around 2016. As mentioned in the body, we believed there to be a structural break sometime around 2015 or 2016. In our search for the optimal break-date, we iteratively ran regressions with a quarterly dummy variable similar to λ i and µ i found in equations (1) and (2), but widening our potential dates to any quarter between 2013:Q1-2017:Q4. We found a global maximum in the R 2 for both the PCE and the CPI in 2016:Q1 (when using annual dummy variables, 2016 is selected as well) at 0.62 and 0.68, respectively. During this process, we discovered that 2015:Q4 proves to be a bit of an anomaly. For instance, when using 2015:Q4 as the break-date, our lagged deviation coefficient estimate flips positive (though our inferences about moving into the box are unchanged). This proves to be a one-off, however: If we omit this quarter from estimation or choose later break-dates, this coefficient estimate is well-behaved. We view this as confirmatory evidence that the end of 2015 was a period during which uncertainty changed for a number of respondents.
A.2 Market Anticipation of Federal Funds Movement
Above, we show that both theory and statistical evidence support the finding that a structural break occurred in 2016:Q1. Here we demonstrate that a break at the end of 2015, owing to a reduced uncertainty about the Federal Reserve commitment to its 2 percent inflation target, is consistent with the expectations of financial market participants about FOMC actions. 22 Financial market data indicate that as early as the spring of 2015, market participants (some of whom may also be respondents in the SPF) began to believe that the Federal Reserve would honor its commitment to its 2 percent inflation target. As seen in Figure 6 , the uncertainty regarding actions that might be undertaken by the FOMC during 2015 greatly fell throughout the year. 23 In late October, financial market participants had serious doubts about whether the Fed would take action that year. But by the December meeting, the market felt it almost certain that a rate increase (the first movement of any sort since the massive rate cuts in the fall of 2008) would take place during that month's meeting. A.3 5Yr/5Yr Forward Rate, and Comparison to 10-Year Forecasts SPF respondents do not report 5year/5year-forward forecasts. If they had been asked, it is possible that a given respondent would have reported something different than the forecast implied by their 5-year and 10-year forecasts. Thus, as a robustness check, we investigate whether our results would be different if we treated the ten-year forecast as a proxy for the 5year/5year-forward forecast. Below we present a table comparing the number of respondents who are absolutely anchored using the implied 5year/5year-forward forecast, as opposed to the number who are absolutely anchored using the 10-year forecast. We do this both for the full sample, and for the period after 2012, i.e., after the FOMC's inflation target announcement. Under this definition of absolutely anchored, our qualitative findings are quite similar: A tiny fraction of respondents are absolutely anchored over the entire period, while less than 20 percent are absolutely anchored if we restrict attention to the post-2012 period. The formula for converting 5-year and 10-year forecasts into 5year/5year-forward forecasts goes as follows: Table 4 : Although there are some respondents absolutely anchored using the 10-year inflation forecast, that number remains a small portion of the total number of respondents.
Using the same specification (1) and (2) on the full set of respondents using the 10-year forecasts yields similar results to those in Table 2 ; see Table 6 . Likewise, F-tests for joint significance, as in Appendix A.1, yielded statistically significant results; see Table 7 . Significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 is denoted at *, **, and ***. † We report the average of δ i , λ i , γ i , and µ i as the coefficient. There is considerable dispersion of these respondent-specific intercept terms. § In lieu of a t-statistic, the F-test statistic from the test for joint significance of λ i , µ i is reported.
F-tests for joint significance were also undertaken, and came back with significant results, in tandem with those done on the 5year/5year-forward rates. 
A.4 CPI/PCE Gap Reverting to the Mean
Taking all respondents as a group, does the CPI/PCE gap revert to the mean? This can be answered with the following regression specification. We find evidence for mean-reversion in this gap. 
A.6 Grouping Respondents
In Table 2 , we display results for two subsets of respondents. As noted above, we grouped respondents based on their responses between 2007-2011. Respondent i's average inflation was computed by taking the average of PCE and the (un-biased) average of CPI, using this formula:
A.7 Inflation Differential
We provide a post-2007 plot of a five-year moving average of the CPI/PCE inflation differential, along with the median estimate of the 5year/5year-forward CPI/PCE inflation differential derived from the SPF. The median differential hovers at or just above 0.2 ppt. As noted above, there is time-variation in this differential, and long-run forecasts of the differential vary to some extent. But as will be immediately evident, our results are rather insensitive to our treatment of this differential. Hence, in this paper we suppress any time variation in the differential. 
A.8 Contemporaneous Forecast
One might wonder whether 5year/5year-forward forecasts are correlated with near-term forecasts. In particular, do respondents who are below the box typically forecast inflation rates that are lower than the median, and do respondents who are above the box typically forecast inflation rates that are higher than the median? The answer is yes. 
A.9 Requisite Box Composition
As an alternative measure of observing how forecasters' behavior has changed over time, we investigate how large would forecaster i's box have had to be in order for i to have been considered absolutely anchored (year by year). How has the distribution of requisite box sizes changed over time? In particular, for each forecaster i, and in parallel to equation 1, we compute
This formula is identical to equation (1), except that boxes are constructed relative to the center of our box (2.0,2.2). In (2), PCEmax i,t and CPImax i,t are now the inflation predictions that are farthest, in absolute value, from the center of the box, over the time period in question.
In Figure 9 , we plot the distribution of box areas from equation (2), for five different years. Our new requisite box has an area of ≈ 0.316. Thus, the first column in each figure essentially represents the percent of respondents that year who were in our box, i.e., absolutely anchored. In 2007, as the Great Recession began to unfold, 38 percent of the responses were in our box; but the distribution has a notable right tail, and encompassing 90 percent of responses would have required a box 137 percent larger. In 2010, the distribution of requisite box sizes had spread out considerably. Only 40 percent of responses were absolutely anchored, and many responses were far from the box; encompassing 90 percent of responses would have required a box 5 times larger (for an area of 1.58) than the original one. In 2012, to encompass 90 percent of responses, one would require a box 262 percent times larger than the standard box. For 2015, a box 184 percent larger would be needed in order to contain 90 percent of responses.
By 2018, the majority of responses were in the box, and 95 percent of responses had requisite box sizes under 0.5. 
A.10 Spread of Responses
As noted above, the covariance matrix's squared determinant is a multivariate gauge of the spread of responses in PCE/CPI. We depict this statistic for each year, 2007-2018, along 
A.11 Respondents Almost in the Box
As we note above, none of the respondents have expectations that were anchored over the entire period. In this section, we explore what "almost anchored" might entail-or equivalently, the sensitivity of our results to the particulars of our definition. Two definitions of "almost in the box" were used: One in which the PCE range was expanded to 1.7-2.3 percent, and the other in which each respondent was allowed one "bad" response for every 14 (which amounts to insisting upon a 92.86 percent "success" rate). We excluded participants with less than 14 responses. Table A .11 below indicates that even with these expanded definitions, depending on which one, only three or one respondent(s) stayed in the box during the entire period.
A.14 Individual Respondents Deviation-from-Target Time Series
Time-series plots of responses for each SPF respondent, parallel to Figure 4 .
